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Abstract: Both single-player Parrondo games (SPPG) and multi-player Parrondo 
games (MPPG) display the Parrondo Effect (PE) wherein two or more individually fair 
(or losing) games yield a net winning outcome if alternated periodically or randomly. 
(There is a more formal, less restrictive definition of the PE.) We illustrate that, when 
subject to an elementary optimization rule, the PG displays degraded rather than en-
hanced returns. Optimization provides only the illusion of control, when low-entropy 
strategies (i.e. which use more information) under-perform random strategies (with 
maximal entropy). This illusion is unfortunately widespread in many human attempts to 
manage or predict complex systems. For the PG, the illusion is especially striking in that 
the optimization rule reverses an already paradoxical-seeming positive gain—the Par-
rondo effect proper—and turns it negative. While this phenomenon has been previously 
demonstrated using somewhat artificial conditions in the MPPG (L. Dinis and J.M.R. 
Parrondo, Europhysics Letters 63, 319 (2003);  J. M. R. Parrondo, L. Dinis, J. Buceta, 
and K. Lindenberg, Advances in Condensed Matter and Statistical Mechanics, eds. E. 
Korutcheva and R. Cuerno, Nova Science Publishers, 2003), we demonstrate it in the 
natural setting of a history-dependent SPPG. 
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A. Formalism of the Parrondo Effect (PE) 
The Parrondo effect is the counterintuitive result where mixing two or more losing 
games can surprisingly produce a winning outcome. The basic Parrondo effect (PE) was 
first identified as the game-theoretic equivalent to directional drift of Brownian particles 
in a time-varying “ratchet”-shaped potential [1,2]. Consider N > 1 s-state Markov games 
i
G , { }1,2, ,i N! K ,and their N s s! transition matrices, ( )ˆ iM . For every ( )ˆ iM , denote the 
vector of s conditional winning probabilities as ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }1 2, ,i i i isp p p=pr K  and their steady-
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state probability vectors as ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }1 2, , ,i i i is! ! !" =
r
K . For each game, the steady-state 
probability of winning is : 
 ( ) ( ) ( )i i i
win
P = !"p
rr  (1) 
Consider also a lengthy sequence of randomly alternating 
i
G with individual time-
averaged proportion of play [ ]
1
0,1 ,  1 
N
i i
i
! !
=
" =# . The transition matrix for the combined 
sequence of games is the convex linear combination  1 2( , , , ) ( )
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i
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tional winning probability vector ( )1 2, , , n! ! !p Kr and steady-state probability vector 
( )1 2, , , n! ! !"
K
r
. The steady-state probability of winning for the combined game is therefore 
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A PE occurs whenever (and in general it is the case that) : 
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hence the PE, or “paradox”, when the left hand side of (4) is less than zero and the right-
hand side greater. 
The original Parrondo game (PG) discussed in [1,2] employs three differently-biased 
coins. The coin to be tossed at a given time-step is determined by the net number of wins 
or losses. This “capital-dependent” PG can be expressed in terms of a 3 3!  Markov tran-
sition matrix. The extension to PE games that are history-dependent was initially made in 
[3] with one history dependent game and the other not; Ref.[4] extends the concept to the 
linear convex combination of two history dependent games. A history-dependent game is 
one in which the prior sequence of wins and losses (of defined length m) determines 
which coin to toss, rather than the value of the accumulated capital. Similar to the use of 
the finite time-horizon τ in the time-horizon Minority Game (THMG) in [3, 4], a two-
state memory-dependent process with memory of two bits is recast as a 22 = 4 -state 
memory-independent Markov process. 
The most basic conditions under which a non-trivial, history-dependent PE might be 
sought are: 
 m = 2 
 N = 2 
 1
1 2 2
! != =  
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 
( ) ( ) ( )1 2 1,21
2win win win
P P P= = <  
 
( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1
win
P = !"p
rr and ( ) ( ) ( )2 2 2
win
P = !"p
rr  
The value m =2 means that the system has 22=4 states: { } { }00,01,10,11 1,2,3,4! , with 0 
= lose, 1 = win. The 4 steady state probabilities are simple algebraic functions of the con-
ditional probabilities, up to a normalization factor: 
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Here we have two fair games alternating at random in equal proportion to yield a winning 
game. Note that ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )1,2 1 1,2 2win win win winP P P P! = ! " # , a finite amount. We suppose that it is 
possible to reduce all conditional probabilities in both games by some sufficiently small 
bias! , such that: 
 
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2
,
win win win win
P P P P
! ! ! !
< < <  
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2
win win win
P P P
! ! ! !
" "# + $ % # < < %  
We thus obtain two losing games alternating at random in equal proportion to yield a 
(still) winning game. We define two fair transition matrices ( ) ( )1 2ˆ ˆ,M M  (games) and bias 
matrix åˆ  with 1
2
! = : 
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( ) ( )
( ) ( )
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1 3
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Then 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ),1 1 2 1 212ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ(1 )! ! ! !" = + " = +M M M M M  (7) 
The example provided in [5], and further analyzed in [6], will be extended here as well: 
 ( ){ } { } ( ){ } { }1 29 71 1 1 1 1 110 4 4 10 2 2 2 2, , , ;   , , ,p p= =  (8) 
Letting !  = 0.005 and substituting (8) in (6), (5) and (2), we obtain (as in [4]): 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 12 2,1 2 1 21
2
0.4945;   0.4950;  0.4947 0.5010
win win win win win
P P P P P! "= = + = < =# $  (9) 
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which illustrates quantitatively the Parrondo effect Pwin(1) >0.5. 
 
B. Time Horizon PG (THPG): Reversal of the PE under Optimization 
Ref.[5.6] present a capital-dependent multi-player PG (MPPG): At (every) time-step t, 
a constant-size subset of all participants is randomly re-selected actually to play. All par-
ticipants keep individual track of their own capital but do not alternate games independ-
ently based on it. Instead, this data is used to select which game (all) selected participants 
must use at t. Given the individual values of the capital at 1t ! , the known matrices of the 
two games and their linear convex combination, the chosen game is the one which has the 
most positive expected aggregate gain in capital, summed over all participants. 
This rule may be thought of as a static optimization procedure—static in the sense that 
the “optimal” choice appears to be known in advance. It appears exactly quantifiable be-
cause of access to each player’s individual history. Indeed, if the game is chosen at ran-
dom, the change in wealth averaged over all participants is significantly positive. But 
when the “optimization” rule is employed, the gain becomes a loss significantly greater 
than that of either game alone. The intended “optimization” scheme actually reverses the 
positive (collective) PE. The reversal arises in this way: The “optimization” rule causes 
the system to spend much more time playing one of the games, and individually, any one 
game is losing.  This collective phenomenon is of interest as an example the phenomenon 
of “illusion of control.” Here, we defined “illusion of control” as situations when low-
entropy strategies (i.e. which use more information) under-perform random strategies 
(with maximal entropy). 
However, the study of Ref.[5,6] has certain “artificial” features in both design and 
outcome. For example, all active players are constrained to “choose” the same rule. Such 
a constraint removes the example from the domain of complex (and most real-world) sys-
tems. The same applies when, as shown in [7], the enforced game is that which appears to 
maximize the wealth of (voted for by) the largest number of players; and even when the 
games being played are history-dependent. Second, the reversal of the PE occurs simply 
because the (enforced) “choices” turn out to be driven largely toward a single game. 
(Some authors have nonetheless attempted to draw social policy lessons from such artifi-
cial collective situations [8].) Of greater interest is the phenomenon presented in [9]: Col-
lective games are shown to undergo a “current reversal” for certain mixing probabilities 
i
! .  
The term “current reversal” highlights the value of examining optimization rules in the 
setting of a PE, especially a positive one: An optimization rule that leads to a loss 
“against the current” of a positive PE is an especially good illustration of the illusion of 
control.  
We present a pointed illustration of the illusion: under the most natural kind of optimi-
zation rule, a “current reversal” (reversal of a positive PE) appears in single-player PG’s. 
This provides the most natural illustration of the illusion of control in PGs, and a suitable 
counterpoint to the analogous phenomenon in the natively collective MG as discussed in 
[10].  
Furthermore, the reversal of the single-player PE under “optimization” is not caused 
by a significant imbalance of the system with respect to one game or another. For the PE 
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in general, algorithms that actually  do maximize the positive PE can be easily generated 
as the consequence of the Markov analysis presented above [5, 11]. These algorithms de-
rive from the transition matrices which are known. They do not include the self-evident-
seeming optimization rule that we employ here, on analogy to that employed in the Mi-
nority Games: At time t, play whichever game has accumulated the most points (wealth) 
over a sliding window of τ prior time-steps from 1t ! to t !" .  
We compare a numerical simulation using the same example games as in (6) through 
(9) (refs [3,4]) to their corresponding analytical formulation. Games ( )1Mˆ and ( )2Mˆ  have 
memory m = 2 prior time steps. We include a time-horizon of length ! located before the 
history ( )tµ  in memory. At the start, a random history of three bits initializes play and 
the first !  steps require a random choice of game. In the simplest instance we let τ = 1. 
The binary sequence of subsequent choices is thus dependent on a sliding window of 
prior binary wins/losses of length 3m !+ = —the first such window of which ( )tµ  is not 
a subset. (Otherwise the exact winning game is defined in advance and the “optimization” 
succeeds trivially.) Whichever game would have won on the previous step had it been 
played (regardless of whether it actually was) is chosen to be played next. The player’s 
wealth is based on the sequence of games actually played. If both games actually would 
have yielded the same outcome, win or lose, one of the two is chosen at random instead.  
By construction, the individual games ( )1Mˆ and ( )2Mˆ played individually are both los-
ing; random alternation between them is winning (the PE effect (4)) The one-player two-
game history-dependent PE in our example is as follows: ( )1Mˆ and ( )2Mˆ have respective 
winning probabilities 1 0.494
win
P =  and 2 0.495
win
P = . Alternated at random in equal pro-
portion ( )1 2 0.5! != = , 1 2
0.5, 0.5
0.501
win
P
! != =
= .We now express the choose-best optimization 
rule in Markov form. Under this rule, the two s s! matrices ( )1Mˆ and ( )2Mˆ  do not com-
bine as a linear convex s s! matrix sum. Instead, the combined game is represented by an 
( ) ( )s s! !+ " +  matrix ( )1,2Qˆ .  The 2s conditional winning probabilities are now 
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( ){ }1 1 2 2 1 212 1 1j j j j j j jq p p p p p p! " " ! " "# $ # $= + % + % +& ' & ' with 1,2, , 2j s= K  and indices 
( ) [ ] [ ] [ ]( )121, 4 1,   1, 2 1j Mod j j j Mod j! "= # + = # # + . (Under the choose-worst rule 
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( ){ }1 1 2 2 1 212 1 1j j j j j j jq p p p p p p! " " ! " "# $ # $= % + + + %& ' & ' ).  
If the previously winning game is selected, (1,2) 0.496best
win
P = , while if the previously 
losing one is, (1,2) 0.507best
win
P = . Unexpectedly, choosing the previously best-performing 
game yields losses only slightly less than either ( )1Mˆ and ( )2Mˆ  individually: The PE is 
almost entirely eliminated. Choosing the previously worst-performing games yields gains 
that exceed the PE proper. 
The steady state probabilities for a simulation over 50 runs  and 200 steps for each of 
the eight different possible initial states are shown in Table 1. The R2 between the fre-
quency of states obtained numerically and analytically is 0.988 over 40,000 runs. 
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Table 1: Analytically predicted and numerically simulated frequencies 
of the eight 3-state binary histories for a single player of two history-
dependent Parrondo games under the “choose previously best” optimi-
zation rule. R2=0.988 over 40,000 runs. 
π Analytic Numeric 
000 0.075 0.072 
001 0.164 0.165 
010 0.172 0.165 
011 0.093 0.097 
100 0.164 0.165 
101 0.101 0.097 
110 0.093 0.097 
111 0.138 0.142 
 
The mechanism for this illusion-of-control effect characterized by the reversing of the 
PE under optimization is not the same as under a similar optimization rule for the Minor-
ity Game [10], as there is no collective effect and thus no-crowding out of strategies or 
games. (Nor is it the same as for the Multi-Player PG) As seen from (4), the PE proper 
results from a distortion of the steady-state equilibrium distributions 
  
! 
(1)r 
"  and   
! 
(2)r 
"  into 
a vector 
  
! 
(
1
" ,
2
" )r 
#  (for the n=2 version) which is more co-linear to the conditional win-
ning probability vector 
  
! 
(
1
" ,
2
" )r 
p  than are either individual game (this is just a geometric 
restatement of the fact that the combined game is winning). One may say that the random 
alternation of the two games tends on average to align these two vectors under the action 
of the other game. Choosing the previously best performing game amounts to removing 
this combined effect, while choosing the previously worst performing game tends to in-
tensify this effect.  
Consider the following simple illustration from [12], with 1
2
! = : 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
5 1 1 2 11
1 2 1,2 1 32 6 3 36 2
51 1 22 1
2 6 3 36 2
1ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ;   ;   
2
! " ! " ! "
= = = + =# $ # $ # $
% & % &% &
M M M M M  (10) 
From (6), (5) and (2): 
 ( ) ( ) ( )1 2 1,231 1
4 4 2
;  ;  
win win win
P P P= = =  (11) 
There is no PE since  
 ( ) ( ) ( )( )1,2 1 212win win winP P P= +  (12) 
The long term gain (loss) associated with ( )ˆ iM  is proportional to ( )i
win
P . This implies unit 
positive or negative reward per time-step. We may however associate arbitrary, differ-
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ently-valued gains and losses. Suppose that for the transitions (elements) of both 
( )1
Mˆ and ( )2Mˆ , we associate instead the following reward matrix Rˆ [12]: 
 
1 3
ˆ
3 1
!" #
= $ %!& '
R  (13) 
Then the time-averaged unit change in wealth associated with  ( )1Mˆ , ( )2Mˆ  and ( )1,2Mˆ  are 
computed as: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( ){ } ( ) ( ) ( ){ } { }1 2 1,2 13ˆ ˆ 1,1 ;   , , 0,0,i i iG G G G! =" # # ! ! ! =R M
v
o
T
 (14) 
Thus, two fair games combine to make a winning game, a PE. The Hadamard product 
matrices ( )( )ˆ ˆ iR Mo
T
  are not Markovian in that their elements are not probabilities, but 
products of a probability and a reward value. One may tinker with either the probabilities 
or the rewards to increase, decrease, eliminate or reverse the direction of the PE. The 
same result is obtained for any set of identical product values regardless of whether it is 
the probability or the reward that is thought of as altered. 
Further light is shed on this phenomenon by considering a fully deterministic variant, 
i.e., where the elements of all ( ) { }ˆ 0,1 .i !M  Consider indeed the following set of ( )ˆ iM , 
which are simply (one possibility for ) equations (10) rounded : 
 ( ) ( )1 2
1 1 0 0
ˆ ˆ;   
0 0 1 1
Det Det
! " ! "
= =# $ # $
% & % &
M M  (15) 
( )1
Mˆ and ( )2Mˆ are now fully deterministic games. ( )1,2Mˆ has the form of a single probabil-
istic game, but is indistinguishable from an alternation between games 1 and 2:  
 ( )
1 1
1,2 2 2
1 1
2 2
ˆ
! "
= # $
% &
M  (16) 
The alternation may be periodic or equiprobably random. Furthermore, we may generate 
a strictly periodic sequence by imposing our “counteradaptive” optimization rule: Play at 
time t  the game that would have lost at time 1t ! . If ( )1Mˆ and ( )2Mˆ are multiplied by re-
ward matrix Rˆ , the time-averaged unit changes in wealth associated with  ( )1Mˆ , ( )2Mˆ  
and ( )1,2Mˆ  are: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( ){ } ( ) ( ) ( ){ } { }1 2 1,2ˆ ˆ 1,1 ;   , , 1, 1, 1i i iG G G G! =" # # ! ! ! = $ $ +R Mv o
T
 (17) 
Thus, we have reproduced what looks like a (winning) PE by imposing a “paradoxi-
cal” optimization rule on the alternation of two wholly deterministic systems. As it hap-
pens for this example, the alternation may be itself a simple deterministic cycle. But the 
same results arise if the deterministic games are alternated at random with 1
2
! = . 
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C. Concluding remarks 
 
In many social and economic activities, human agents attempt to maximize value. We 
often do so by adjusting our present strategy in accord with what has previously worked 
best. Yet this very adjustment often proves to have exactly the opposite effect—causing 
greater losses than if we had left well enough alone. A classic everyday example which 
has been analyzed in these terms is weaving in and out of traffic—we rarely gain, and 
often lose by doing so. We would do better sticking to whatever lane we find ourselves in 
[13]. The negative power of this effect is demonstrated by the perverse phenomenon 
which we have here highlighted as well: that in certain games, deliberately selecting what 
appears to be the worst approach can “paradoxically” enhance gains. While this effect 
follows directly in the MG (and in lane switching) from the “minority wins” rule, here a 
similar effect arises without requiring any such competitive mechanism. 
 
 
 
References: 
 
1 G. P. Harmer and D. Abbott, Nature 402, 864 (1999). 
2 G. P. Harmer and D. Abbott, Statistical Science 14, 206 (1999). 
3 J. M. R. Parrondo, G. P. Harmer, and D. Abbott, Physical Review Letters 85, 
5226 (2000). 
4 R. J. Kay and N. F. Johnson, Physical Review E 67, 56128 (2003). 
5 L. Dinis and J.M.R. Parrondo, Europhysics Letters 63, 319 (2003). 
6 J. M. R. Parrondo, L. Dinis, J. Buceta, and K. Lindenberg, Advances in Con-
densed Matter and Statistical Mechanics, eds. E. Korutcheva and R. Cuerno 
(Nova Science Publishers, 2003). 
7 L. Dinís and J. M. R. Parrondo, Physica A 343, 701 (2004). 
8 R. Toral, Fluctuation and Noise Letters 2, L305 (2002). 
9 P. Amengual, P. Meurs, B. Cleuren, et al., Arxiv preprint math.PR/0601404  
(2006). 
10 J. Satinover and D. Sornette, Illusion of control in Minority and Parrondo games, 
preprint(2007). 
11 D. Zeilberger, in Personal Journal of Shalosh B. Ekhad and Doron Zeilberger, 
2000). 
12 A. Allison and D. Abbott, in Annals of the International Society of Dynamic 
Games, edited by A. S. Nowack and K. Szajowski (Birkhäuser, Adelaide, 2003 ). 
13 T. Chmura and T. Pitz, Physica A 363, 477 (2006). 
 
  
 
